SUMMARY
On the evening of October 12, 2002, two bomb blasts destroyed two nightclubs in Bali, killing more than 180 people including 88 Australians. There were scores of severely injured, of whom 66 were evacuated to Darwin, and large numbers of walking wounded.
Anaesthetists have training that prepares them for resuscitation and emergency management of trauma victims, including work in intensive care and retrieval medicine. This means that appropriately trained and experienced anaesthetists can provide a unique continuity of care to disaster victims. The important role that an anaesthetic trainee played in the initial care of the Australian casualties whilst at the Sanglah Hospital in Denpasar has previously been described 1 . The critical role of the military staff, several of whom were anaesthetists, in emergency care and evacuation from Denpasar to Darwin and subsequently from Darwin to burns centres around Australia has also been described 2 . The overall management of what happened in Darwin 3 , and in particular the intensive care unit 4 have been described in detail. In this paper we detail the role that anaesthetists had in the Darwin management of the response to the Bali bombing so that others may be better prepared in the event of other disasters occurring near isolated hospitals such as Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH).
The Events
On the weekend of October 12 and 13, 2002, the Anaesthetic and Intensive Care Unit staff were gathered together for the inaugural Northern Territory Continuing Medical Education Meeting. Proceedings of the second morning were interrupted as one of the specialist anaesthetists, an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Reservist, was tasked to go to Bali on the first Hercules aircraft. Before the end of the day, several staff had left to attend command centre briefings back at the hospital.
The Director of Anaesthesia attended Command Centre briefings over the course of October 13 and as the events evolved, initiated the Anaesthesia subplan of the External Disaster plan of the hospital. All anaesthetists on the staff were notified of the plans to evacuate the most severely injured Australians and foreign nationals from Bali to Darwin and the likely role that would be required of them. All elective operating was cancelled for the next five days. The duty staff of the weekend liased with surgeons to rationalize which existing booked emergency theatre cases would be done prior to the arrival of the casualties, as well as preparing the operating theatres for multi-trauma cases.
As in most hospitals, the number of specialist anaesthetists is significantly greater than the number of intensivists or emergency physicians. It was decided that the emergency physicians would be best utilized in the hospital Emergency Department and that an airport team of anaesthetists and intensive care nurses would take over care of the most critically ill patients from the ADF staff. Details of exact casualty numbers and times of arrival at the airport remained sketchy until late in the evening. The clinical details of the patients were unknown until just before arrival of the first aircraft.
The Director of Anaesthesia led a hospital team to the airport, consisting of two specialist anaesthetists (all three of whom had significant intensive care experience) with two aeromedical retrieval doctors (who worked regularly in anaesthesia) and two intensive care nurses. The plan was that these staff would be able to accompany the ambulance officers during the transport of the most critically ill patients back to the hospital. The first of the interstate intensive care retrieval service teams was at the airport, with five doctors (several of whom were anaesthetists), and two aircraft. The two teams worked together with the ADF to reassess the patients and receive handover. The hospital medical and nursing staff were allocated to the most severely injured to continue resuscitation on the ten-minute journey to RDH. The leader of the hospital team liased with the Ambulance Controller to ensure that the ambulances left the airport at regularly spaced intervals so that the hospital Emergency Department was not inundated with casualties. The hospital team leader was in mobile phone contact with the hospital command centre, the ICU and the Emergency Department to ensure they had accurate information on the arrival situation of the aircraft and the condition of the casualties. This team met each of the aircraft that arrived from Bali with bombing victims at 0200, 0730, 1200 and 1300 hours and the same procedure was followed.
The anaesthetists who accompanied the most critically ill patients followed the patients they were caring for through the Emergency Department where they led ongoing resuscitation efforts, to intensive care where they also managed their care and in several cases took them onto the operating theatre for emergency procedures to be performed. They worked as part of the team in each of these environments, but importantly, provided continuity and reduced the need for multiple handovers. In one case the continuity of care lasted for 12 hours, with appropriate breaks to maintain optimal performance.
Many of the anaesthetic staff were involved in the intensive care management of patients. Intubating victims with facial and airway burns at just over 24 hours following the bombing tested the skills of all the specialists. Five of the six intubations in ICU were classed as difficult and techniques varying from bougie, awake blind to fibreoptic intubation were used. Anaesthetists were able to provide backup to the intensivists when they took rest periods.
The RDH has five operating theatres and a procedure room in the theatre suite. A co-located private hospital has three operating theatres but much of the anaesthesia equipment in the private hospital had been used to set up an additional four ICU beds in the recovery area. Thus it was planned to have five operating theatres functional for whatever the duration required in the management of the Bali bomb victims. One of these was planned to be used for inhospital emergencies such as caesarean section and other non-Bali related emergencies. Three operating theatres were set up with invasive monitoring, warmed fluid resuscitation systems and forcedair warming. Due to limitations of equipment availability, the fourth theatre was set up for more minor cases. Overall, the Darwin surgical workload for a disaster of this proportion was relatively light. Many of the emergency procedures had been done in Bali. Escharotomies were done in the Emergency Department and ICU and the majority of patients were relocated to burns units in other states before they needed definitive burns surgery. There were 19 cases performed in the operating theatres over the next 36 hours; 10 were debridement of wounds, washout of joints and fracture management, three amputations, three major body cavity procedures, two major vascular procedures and one definitive burn debridement and grafting. Teams of specialist and registrar anaesthetists provided anaesthesia services and these were rotated to alleviate fatigue. Several staff members were held in reserve, well rested, as initially it was not clear how many and for how long the patients would remain in Darwin.
The various departments and teams within the hospital worked in an integrated and cohesive manner. The extraordinary stoicism of the victims amazed staff who worked together to save lives and manage injuries optimally.
DISCUSSION
High-quality medical management of victims of a disaster such as the Bali bombing requires skilled airway management, speedy vascular access as well as recognition and management of other life-and limbthreatening injures. Emergency medicine physicians, intensivists as well as anaesthetists generally have most of these skills but when large numbers of practitioners are needed most hospitals have more anaesthetists than either of the other two specialties. Many institutions have considerably more anaesthetists than operating theatres, so usually some anaesthetists will be able to attend the scene of a disaster without compromising the skills required in the theatre suite. A number of factors contributed to reduce the impact of the Bali bombing on the hospital in terms of crisis management. In particular, there was initial triage and management of patients performed in Bali, and a significant lead-time allowed institution of the disaster plan and preparation of the emergency areas. This highlights the need to ensure that a disaster plan is scrutinized in terms of what may eventuate in a particular locality. Darwin has experienced major devastation four times in a century, three times by cyclone and once by military bombing. These would present a very different scenario to manage. In such a situation where essential hospital infrastructure including pressurized medical gases and electricity are restricted, it may prove beneficial to consider training in draw-over anaesthetic techniques.
The scene of a disaster will often involve interplay between police, ambulance staff and other emergency services as well as the medical staff. Whilst many emergency physicians have had training in this area, it is not currently part of anaesthesia training. Short courses do exist to train staff in the medical aspects of disaster management and to understand the roles of other emergency services (Major Incident Medical Management and Support [MIMMS], Advanced Life Support Group). We believe that Departments of Anaesthesia which exist in isolated hospitals such as major rural centres should ensure that they have significant input into their hospital external disaster plan and that at least one if not two members of the staff have had training in disaster management.
Anaesthetists have a very valuable contribution to make in the disaster management team. They are the only medical personnel with the skills to provide true continuity of care from the scene of accident or disaster, through resuscitation phases to the postoperative setting.
